The sample is comprised of proportional subsets of the major confessions - 924 Christians; 660 Sunni; 660 Shiites and 156 Druze. Proportional quantities of other variables - age, sex, region, and income level - are also factored into the full sample.

Political Context

Field work for this survey, conducted between July 3 and July 11, was carried out between two significant events in recent Lebanese political history.

Nearly two years of political brinksmanship between the March 8 opposition group and the majority March 14 coalition came to a violent turning point between May 7 and May 15 when Hezbollah and its allies effectively closed Beirut's airport, destroyed government-allied media outlets, occupied much of West Beirut and attacked Druze forces in the Chouf. The short conflict, widely viewed as a victory for March 8 coalition partners, precipitated a conference in Doha among key leaders from all sides of the political spectrum.

On May 22, with considerable assistance from the Qatari leaders, the conference participants negotiated an agreement that ended a fifteen-month conflict in Lebanon during which March 8 allies contested the legitimacy of the Sinioria government. The Doha Accord prescribed the make-up of a national unity government, ended the downtown Beirut sit-in, resolved key issues concerning a new electoral law and affirmed consensus that Army General Michel Sleiman would be duly elected as president by Parliament.

From May 25, when Parliament nearly unanimously elected Sleiman president as stipulated at Doha, until July 11, government and opposition leaders negotiated the composition of the 30-member Council of Ministers, a representative body that today is represented by 16 members of the March 14 coalition, 11 members of the March 8 coalition and three presidential appointments.

It was at the end of this six-week negotiating period that Statistics Lebanon carried out its field work - after the May crisis, the Doha Accord and the election of President Sleiman and immediately before the composition of the national unity government was announced.

National Mood & Priorities

When asked which are the two most important issues facing Lebanon today, 70 percent of respondents list the economy. The second highest answer - security - is given by 27 percent of respondents, up from 10 percent in this April survey. (Field work for this April survey was conducted between March 28 and April 8.)

Hezbollah's weapons ranked third as a major issue of concern, at ten percent. In this April survey, the issue of Hezbollah's weapons barely noted mentioning, with just two percent saying it was an important issue.

Seventy percent believe the country is headed in the wrong direction, 18 percent said Lebanon is headed in the right direction and ten percent respond they didn't know. The respondents' pessimism, while certainly high, is lower than average. This negative response actually represents a decline of 16 percentage points from this April survey, when 86 percent responded with wrong direction - the highest recorded negative responses to this question in two years of LOAC polls.

Of the confessions, Christians gave the highest number of “right track” responses with 20 percent, up from 7 percent in this April survey.

Despite pessimistic perceptions of the political and social climate, most of those surveyed said they would not leave Lebanon. Sixty-one percent of respondents said they would not leave Lebanon to live elsewhere for an indefinite period, whatever the circumstances. Thirty-nine percent said they would leave Lebanon now to live elsewhere for an indefinite period if they had the opportunity.

The final question of the survey - after 28 questions about political leadership, confessionalism, the political and economic situation, the security of Lebanon and other current events - revisited the issue of the general state of things in Lebanon. When asked to choose a statement that was generally optimistic or one that was pessimistic about the immediate future, 62 percent of respondents choose the darker view - “the worst of the political crisis is ahead of us,” while 37 percent choose “the worst of the political crisis is behind us.” The 8-point difference between the more pessimistic answer at the beginning of the survey (70 percent wrong track) suggests some opinion softened slightly after a discussion of recent events. Results show that respondents are generally happy with some recent political outcomes - the election of President Sleiman, electoral boundaries and the Doha Accord, in particular.

Opinion is split on which confession or group is most concerned about their future in Lebanon, 19 percent of the full sample identified the Christians. The response is markedly different from this April survey when 38 percent responded with Christians.

Despite Christians being the top answer among all respondents, there are significant changes of opinion from this April survey within each confession. Among the Sunni respondents to the question, 46 percent chose Sunni as the confession the most concerned. A 20 percent increase is visible between April and July 2008, showing additional concerns and fears among the Sunni population in Lebanon.

Freedom of Press

During the May crisis, field reporters and camera operators from both opposition and government-allied news organizations were harassed and beaten and at least three media outlets - all of which are run by government-allied organizations - were destroyed during the conflict. At the time, Lebanese news media were perceived as having played a role in exacerbating the violence with lopsided reporting of events.

To test citizen indignation toward the violence against news media personnel and property, this survey asked respondents if they believe forcibly halting the press from doing its work is ever justified, even when reporting is perceived as biased or prejudiced. Remarkably, half of those surveyed believe it is acceptable to forcibly halt the press from doing its work if the press is purposely distorting the truth. There are no appreciable variations between the attitudes of the different groups for this response. All age groups and confessions, regardless of their educational background, generally show a lack of reprehension at the recent violence against news media. Only within Sunni and Christian responses are they any appreciable differences of opinion within confessions.

Government and Constitution

Just four percent of respondents believe the resistance (Hezbollah) should have sole responsibility for national defense; 62 percent believe that national defense should be the responsibility of government forces (national police and army) alone; and 34 percent of respondents believe that national defense should be jointly assumed by government forces and the resistance.

This survey demonstrates some changes in citizen perception from this April survey with respect to the role the resistance in national defense. Whereas in this April poll respondents demonstrated general willingness (45%) to include the resistance in the national defense structure, today there is an 11 percent increase in the percentage of respondents who believe that defense should be sole responsibility government forces alone.

The Shiites, in particular, largely disagree with other confessions on this issue, with 70 percent of the subset in this poll saying the army and the resistance should jointly undertake national defense.

One of the initial outcomes of the Doha Conference, was that sitting Prime Minister Fouad Siniora would remain in his post in the next government. Siniora was nominated by the March 14 coalition and appointed by President Sleiman to remain in his post in the next government. While the responses for this survey were being collected, Siniora and Sleiman were negotiating with both coalitions on the remaining 29 appointments to the new Council of Ministers.

Overall satisfaction with Siniora's appointment is 45 percent. For this question respondents were given the choice of four responses ranging from Very Satisfied to Very Dissatistfied. The highest number of responses for Siniora (a Sunni) is Very Dissatisfied, with 32 percent of respondents providing this answer. Shiites and Christian responses comprise most of the answers for Very Dissatisfied category. Fifty-six percent of Sunni say they are Very Satisfied with Siniora's appointment.

The Lebanese President

On May 25, after a six-month presidential void during which Lebanon's opposing political factions could neither agree on the process for electing a president, nor on acceptable nominees, General Michel Sleiman was elected president by Parliament.

his survey demonstrates a remarkable 91 percent rate of approval for the new president. As with the previous question for Prime Minister Siniora, respondents were given the same four choices to test intensity of opinion. Fifty percent of respondents say they are very satisfied with Sleiman, with just two percent responding they are very dissatisfied. The strongly positive response to Sleiman cuts across all age, confessional and regional subsets, with people over 60 years old (67% very satisfied) and Sunni (58% very satisfied) particularly pleased with the new president.

Near the end of Lebanon's Civil War in 1989, the Lebanese Constitution was amended to reflect new power sharing agreements negotiated by Lebanese leaders in Taif, Saudia Arabia. The Taif Amendments redistributed the delicate balance of power among Christians and Muslims, in particular removing some of the prerogatives of the Lebanese president (traditionally held by a Christian) and strengthening the role of prime minister (traditionally held by a Sunni).

When respondents are asked if they are in favor of changing the Taif Amendments to strengthen the role of the Lebanese president, 66 percent of respondents signaled approval. As might be expected, the Christian respondents express highest agreement (84%) and Sunni respondents express the least willingness to do so (49%).

President Sleiman, in his inaugural address, outlined two near-term initiatives he planned to undertake during his term of office: establishing diplomatic relations with Syria and conferring the rights of citizenship to people of Lebanese descent living outside of Lebanon. This survey tested citizenship perceptions of both initiatives, though without characterizing either as presidential policy goals. LOAC's aim was to gauge perception of these ideas exclusive of respondents' opinions of the president.

onetheless, respondents are strongly in favor of both issues. Eighty-eight percent approve of the establishing diplomatic relation with Syria and 82 percent support giving the rights of citizenship to those who can prove Lebanese descent.

May Civil Crisis

Hezbollah and its military allies moved with ease to affect their soft coup of the previous government during the May civil crisis. March 14-allied security personnel were routed during urban fighting in West Beirut, a victory that was decided in less than 24 hours. The Lebanese Army, rather than confront opposition forces, appeared rather to contain the violence, often occupying buildings immediately after Hezbollah and its allies attacked the inhabitants.

However, this survey demonstrates that an overwhelming number of respondents - 78 percent - considered that the Lebanese Army showed no bias to either of the two groups, with 21 percent responding that the army was biased in favor of the opposition.

Most notably, 72 percent respondents from West Beirut, who live in the portion of the city where the fighting took place, agreed with the full sample on this matter. Among confessional groups, 86 percent of Christian respondents believe the Army showed no bias.

majority of Druze respondents (56 %), however – reflect the perception that the Army acted in a way that supported March 8 forces.

To test perceptions of the cause of the crisis, LOAC surveyed respondents on two opposing and extreme points of view. Though there are myriad explanations for what may have precipitated the violence, LOAC focused on the beliefs that the crisis was started either by those desiring to advance American interests in Lebanon or Iranian interests in Lebanon. A third option given to respondents tested how many believe the crisis was caused by other reasons. Thirty-one percent of respondents believe the crisis was caused to advance the American project in Lebanon, 26 percent believe it was caused to advance the Iranian project, but most respondents - 41 percent – consider the crisis occurred for other reasons.

The Doha Agreement

Key accomplishments at Doha included agreement on composition of a national unity government, revised boundaries for electoral districts for the 2009 parliamentary election and election of Army Commander Michel Sleiman as president. Most respondents in this survey are generally pleased with the outcomes of Doha, with a smaller number believing that March 8 or the March 14 coalition benefitted more strongly from the negotiated settlement.

Seventy-eight percent of the respondents agree with the following statement: “The agreements reached at Doha are a reasonable compromise in which neither side benefitted at the expense of the other.”

Confirming even more strongly the Lebanese satisfaction with the agreement signed by their leaders at Doha, 85 percent of respondents believe Doha was “mostly good for Lebanon.”

However, not all perceptions of the Doha Agreement are positive. Respondents are mostly pessimistic that the good faith reached at Doha would continue. Fifty-two percent of respondents replied it was unlikely Lebanese leaders could maintain the spirit of agreement reached at Doha without international supervision.

Perhaps a better illustration of respondents' negativity about the durability of the Doha Agreement, is a question related to Hezbollah's arms. 75 percent of the respondents believe it is not possible that a binding political agreement can be honored in Lebanon with one group better armed than the rest.

Shiites respondents, most of whom live in regions where Hezbollah is the dominant political party, notably are in general agreement with this statement. There is some difference of opinion, however, between the Bekaa respondents and those from The South. Sixty-nine percent of Bekaa respondents believe it is not possible for binding political agreements to be honored when one group is better armed than the rest, while 30 percent of respondents from The South hold this view.

Fighting during the May civil crisis occurred mostly between Sunni and Shiite combatants. When asked to pick one of two statements designed to gauge whether Doha signaled improving Sunni-Shiite relations or conversely, whether the May civil crisis signaled a deterioration of Sunni-Shiite relations, 53 percent of respondents chose the latter.

A look at the answers of respondents from each confessional group shows Shiite respondents are generally more sanguine about relations between the two groups.

Electoral Law

Lebanese leaders at Doha agreed the next parliamentary elections, scheduled for June, 2009, would be conducted along boundaries used in Lebanon's 1960 electoral law, with some modifications. With some exceptions, the boundaries are contiguous with existing cada. Further, the Doha Agreement also stipulated that the reforms recommended by the Boutros Commission would be enacted by the Parliament. As of the release of this poll, Parliament has yet to approve those reforms.

Eighty-one percent of respondents surveyed noted that they were satisfied with the boundaries of the new electoral law and most respondents - 80 percent - believe these new boundaries will positively affect their confession's representation in Parliament.

With some reforms still expected to be enacted by Parliament, 72 percent of respondents communicated their preference that elections should happen as scheduled regardless of which electoral law is used to conduct them. Twenty-eight percent are in favor of postponing the elections if an adequate law has not yet been adopted.

Only the Sunni subset shows some divergence of opinion vis a vis other confessions on the issue of timely elections. Forty-one percent of Sunnis surveyed prefer postponement of parliamentary elections if an adequate law has not yet been finalized.

Opposition vs. March 14

Two types of questions were fielded to test preferences for candidates allied with both coalitions - one to test respondents' perception of which side would win if elections were held now; and another to test respondents' personal preference for candidates from one or the other side.

ess than four percentage points separates March 14 from March 8 when respondents are asked how they intend to vote. Thirty-eight percent of respondents said they intended to vote for candidates aligned with the March 14 coalition and 34 percent said they intended to vote for March 8 candidates.

However, respondents reflect more confidence in March 8 candidates' chances in the next elections over those from March 14. Respondents were asked, “Regardless of your personal preference for either the government (March 14) or the opposition (March 8) coalition, if parliamentary elections were held today, who in your opinion would win the most seats?” Thirty-nine percent of the respondents said opposition will win more seats in next parliament, while 32 percent chose March 14 candidates. Twenty-nine percent said they do not know.

This April survey reflected stronger perceptions of both party's chances at winning more seats in the next election. “Don't know” responses to this question in April was 14 percent; today the number of the same responses is 29 percent. There are marked differences from April to July within the confessions with respect to perceptions on the strength of each coalition's chances at elections. The Druze show the biggest drop in confidence from April in the March 14 coalition's chances. The Shiites show the biggest drop in confidence in the opposition coalition's chances.

Male respondents tend to have a stronger impression of March 14 coalition chances in the upcoming parliamentary elections that do women.

Leadership Preferences

Consistent with previous LOAC polls, the most frequent topline response is “no one” when respondents are asked which political leader or party appeals to them most. Twenty-three percent of those surveyed reply “no one” to the political leader that appeal to them most, and 29 percent of those surveyed reply the same when asked which political party appealed to them most.

Among Shiites the most frequent choice for most appealing leader is Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah (50%); the top choice among Sunni is Member of Parliament and Majority Leader Saad Hariri (29%); among Christians it is “no one” (29%); and 53 percent of Druze respondents name parliamentarian Walid Jumblatt.

Christian respondents are the most divided when it comes to leadership choices, with almost an equal number choosing Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea (22%) and Free Patriotic Movement President Michel Aoun (24%); six percent choose Nasrallah; six percent choose former President of the Republic and Kataeb Party President Amine Gemayel; and four percent name Marada chief Sleiman Franjieh as their top choice.

In this April poll, Speaker of Parliament and Amal Party president Nabih Berri surpassed Nasrallah as most appealing leader among Shiites respondents. In fact, among Shiites - Nasrallah's most supportive sect - identification with Hassan Nasrallah plummeted from 62 percent in December, 2006 to 37 percent in July, 2007 to 32 percent today in April, 2008 (a 30 point decline in an 18-months period). In this survey, however, Shiites respondents choose Nasrallah with greater frequency - a result more consistent with results from LOAC's first three polls in which Nasrallah was top choice for Shiites.

Most parties continue to gain their support from one confessional group. Among Christians the Free Patriotic Movement and Lebanese Forces achieve the highest rates of support. Hezbollah garners the most significant level of support among Shiites, marking an eight-point increase from this April poll. Sunni and Druze are more likely than the other confessions to endorse only one significant party as opposed to spreading support over several. For the Druze, that party is the Progressive Socialists and for the Sunni it is Future Movement.

The tables below demonstrate the top party preferences by confession in response to the question:

Which political party best represents your point of view?

CHRISTIANS